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1Abstract
Two general forms of standard licensing policies are considered for a non-drastic
cost-reducing innovation: (a) combination of an upfront fee and uniform linear
royalty, and (b) combination of auction and uniform linear royalty. It is shown
that in an oligopoly, the total reduction in the cost due to the innovation for
the pre-innovation competitive output forms the lower bound of the payoﬀs
of both outsider and incumbent innovators. Further, the private value of the
patent is increasing in the magnitude of the innovation, while the Cournot
price and the payoﬀ of any other ﬁrm fall below their respective pre-innovation
levels. Suﬃciently signiﬁcant innovations from an outsider innovator are li-
censed exclusively to a single ﬁrm. Otherwise, all other ﬁrms, except perhaps
one, become licensees. The dissemination of the innovation is generally higher
with an incumbent innovator compared to an outsider. For both outsider and
incumbent innovators, the monopoly does not provide the highest incentive to
innovate; for suﬃciently insigniﬁcant innovations, it is the duopoly that does
so, and, the industry size that provides the highest incentive increases with the
magnitude of the innovation. Finally, it is argued that signiﬁcant innovations
are more likely to occur when the innovator is an incumbent ﬁrm.
Keywords: Non-drastic innovation, outsider innovator, incumbent innovator,
FR policy, AR policy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D21, D43, D45.
21 Introduction
Patent licensing by means of a combination of upfront fee and royalty is one
of the most commonly observed licensing policies in practice [see, e.g., Taylor
and Silberstone (1973), Rostoker (1984)]. This paper considers optimal com-
bination of upfront fee and royalty for licensing of a cost-reducing innovation
and discusses its impact on the price and the structure of the market, payoﬀs
of the agents, and incentives and dissemination of innovation in case of both
outsider and incumbent innovators. The formal analysis of patent licensing was
initiated by Arrow (1962). Considering licensing of a cost-reducing innovation
by means of uniform linear royalty only, he concluded that the innovator’s li-
censing rent in a perfectly competitive industry exceeds that when the same
innovation is sold to a monopolist. However, Arrow (1962) did not consider
the aspect of strategic interaction among the ﬁrms, which plays a crucial role
in an oligopoly. The eﬀect of innovations in such an industry depends, among
other factors, on whether the innovator is an outsider or an incumbent ﬁrm.
A cost-reducing innovation is said to be drastic [Arrow (1962)] if the
monopoly price under the new technology does not exceed the competitive price
under the old technology; otherwise, it is non-drastic. Clearly, if an incumbent
innovator is a monopolist, or if she is endowed with a drastic cost-reducing
innovation, she extracts the entire monopoly proﬁt with the new technology.
The same fact is true for an outsider innovator when the industry size is at
least two. When an outsider innovator faces a monopolist, then irrespective of
whether the innovation is drastic or not, the innovator obtains the diﬀerence
between the respective monopoly proﬁts with the new and the old technology.
Thus, the issue of patent licensing is non-trivial only in case the innovation is
non-drastic. For this reason, we shall only consider non-drastic innovations.
The interaction of an outsider innovator and the ﬁrms was ﬁrst studied in
3a formal game-theoretic setting independently by Kamien and Tauman (1984,
1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). The literature mainly considers
three standard policies of licensing, namely, (1) a ﬂat pre-determined upfront
fee, (2) a uniform per-unit linear royalty payment, and, (3) auctioning oﬀ a
limited number of licenses through a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, where the
highest bidders pay their bids and get licenses. In what follows, we provide
a brief overview of the literature. We refer to Kamien (1992) for an excellent
survey on patent licensing. See also Reinganum (1989) for a comprehensive
survey on various aspects of innovation, including licensing.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) have considered a three-stage game of an asym-
metric duopoly, where in the ﬁrst stage, an outsider innovator sells the patent
to one of the ﬁrms by auction. In the second stage, the licensee decides ei-
ther to exclude his rival, or to share the license through a licensing policy
based exclusively on upfront fee and in the ﬁnal stage, the ﬁrms are engaged
in strategic competition. Investigating the pattern of licensing and exclusion,
Katz and Shapiro (1985) have found that while minor innovations will be li-
censed when ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient, exclusion will occur in case of major
innovations. Considering the auction policy as the licensing scheme of the
patent, Katz and Shapiro (1986) have shown that while the seller’s incentive
to develop the innovation may be very high, the incentive to disseminate it may
be too low. Considering licensing by means of either an exclusive upfront fee
or an exclusive linear royalty, Kamien and Tauman (1986) have shown that for
linear demand, both for the innovator, and from social point of view, licensing
by upfront fee is better than royalty. Further, like Arrow (1962), they have
shown that with royalty licensing, the perfectly competitive industry provides
the highest incentive for innovation. For upfront fee licensing, however, there
is no sharp conclusion regarding the relation between the industry size and
the incentive to innovate, and, it depends on the magnitude of the innovation.
Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) have extended these results for general de-
4mand and have shown that among the three standard policies, licensing by
means of royalty is inferior to the other two while upfront fee is inferior to
auction, both for consumers and the innovator. Erutku and Richelle (2000)
have shown that in an oligopoly with at least two ﬁrms, an outsider innova-
tor can always design an upfront fee plus royalty policy which enables her to
extract the entire monopoly proﬁt with the new technology.1 This result is
obtained with a non-linear royalty which depends on the total output of the
industry and individual outputs of potential licensees. However, to the best of
our knowledge, such policies are not observed in practice.
Although the theoretical literature shows the superiority of both auction
and upfront fee to royalty, as licensing schemes, royalties and combination of
upfront fee and royalty policies are more prevalent than other standard forms
of licensing. In the oft-quoted survey of Rostoker (1984) of corporate licensing,
upfront fee plus royalty policy was observed in 46% of cases, whereas licensing
by means of exclusive royalty was observed in 39% of the ﬁrms surveyed. An
attempt to bridge the discrepancy between empirical observations and theoret-
ical predictions was made by Wang (1998), who considered a model of Cournot
duopoly where the innovator is not an outsider, but one of the ﬁrms.2 In this
framework, licensing by means of royalty yields better payoﬀ to the innovator
than upfront fee licensing. Extending the work of Wang (1998), Kamien and
Tauman (2002) have shown that in a Cournot oligopoly, for suﬃciently sig-
niﬁcant (but non-drastic) innovations, licensing by means of linear royalty is
superior to both auction and upfront fee policies for an incumbent innovator.3
1For other selling mechanisms that enable the innovator to obtain the maximum industry
proﬁt with the innovation, see Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) and Sen (2002a).
2Katz and Shapiro (1985) have considered a duopoly where one of the ﬁrms is a patent
holder. However, they only dealt with upfront fee licensing.
3The role of asymmetric information has also been considered to explain the prevalence
of royalty licensing. See, e.g., Beggs (1992), Sen (2002b).
5In this paper, we merge this new line of enquiry with the standard literature
and consider both outsider and incumbent innovators. We propose licensing
schemes that are more general than the standard policies examined in the
literature.4 Speciﬁcally, we consider two policies: (i) the “upfront fee plus uni-
form linear royalty” (FR) policy, where each licensee pays a pre-determined
upfront fee, and a uniform royalty per-unit of production;5 and, (ii) the “auc-
tion plus uniform linear royalty” (AR) policy, where the innovator announces
a uniform linear royalty and the number of licenses to be sold, say m; then,
each ﬁrm bids for the license and m highest bidders win the license, and, pay
their respective bids in addition to the announced uniform royalty per-unit
of production. Clearly, these policies encompass the three standard licensing
policies, viz., upfront fee, royalty, and auction. It should be mentioned that
for both outsider and incumbent innovators, if the number of licensees is less
than the industry size, then the AR policy is superior to the FR policy, and
the FR policy is superior otherwise.6
It is shown that the total reduction of cost due to the innovation for the pre-
innovation competitive quantity forms the lower bound of the payoﬀ of both
outsider and incumbent innovators. Further, in both cases, the payoﬀ of the
innovator is increasing in the magnitude of the innovation, while the Cournot
price and the payoﬀ of any other ﬁrm fall below their respective pre-innovation
levels. Thus, consumers are better oﬀ and ﬁrms are worse oﬀ as a result of the
innovation. Other results of this paper depend on whether the innovator is an
incumbent ﬁrm or not.
When an outsider innovator faces a monopolist, she extracts the diﬀerence
4With the possible exception of Erutku and Richelle (2000).
5This licensing policy was ﬁrst examined by Kamien and Tauman (1984), but only asymp-
totic results (with respect to the industry size) were obtained.
6This holds unless the auction includes a ﬂoor price, in which case, the two policies
coincide. However, note that the FR policy is more attractive as it is simpler to implement.
6between the respective monopoly proﬁts with the new and the old technology
through an upfront fee. When the industry size is at least two, then suﬃciently
signiﬁcant innovations are sold to an exclusive license, which is consistent with
Firestone (1971) and Caves, Crookell and Killing (1983), where it was pointed
out that patents from independent innovators are often licensed exclusively.
Relatively less signiﬁcant innovations are sold to all ﬁrms, except perhaps one.
For an incumbent innovator, suﬃciently signiﬁcant innovations are sold to all
ﬁrms, whereas less signiﬁcant innovations are sold to all ﬁrms, except one.
Thus, the dissemination of the innovation is generally higher with an incumbent
innovator. The results can be summarized in the following table.7
−[Insert Table 1]−
Regarding the incentives to innovate, the conclusions are qualitatively the
same for both outsider and incumbent innovators. We show that for both
cases, the industry size that provides the highest incentive to innovate is in-
creasing in the magnitude of the innovation. In particular, for both cases, the
monopoly never provides the highest incentive. When the innovation is suﬃ-
ciently insigniﬁcant, the duopoly does so, and, as the innovation becomes more
signiﬁcant, a more competitive industry provide the highest incentive.
Finally, keeping the number of ﬁrms other than the innovator ﬁxed, we
argue that signiﬁcant innovations are more likely to occur from an incumbent
innovator. The comparison between outsider and incumbent innovators is con-
ceptually problematic, since the two innovators cannot be embedded in the
same model. One way of dealing with this problem is by providing an out-
sider innovator with the option of entering the industry. It is shown that in
the presence of a negligible but positive cost of entry, when the innovation is
suﬃciently signiﬁcant, an outsider innovator is better oﬀ entering the industry
7The table and ﬁgures are available from the ﬁrst author upon request.
7and selling the license to every ﬁrm. Otherwise, the innovator remains outside.
In other words, the private value of an innovation is higher for an incumbent
innovator when the innovation is suﬃciently signiﬁcant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model and the licensing schemes. In Section 3, we discuss about the optimal
licensing schemes. The relation between the market structure and incentives
to innovate is discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare the incentives
for outsider and incumbent innovators by providing an outsider innovator with
the strategy of entry. All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
Let us describe the model with an outsider innovator in detail. The model with
an incumbent innovator will be similar, except for some obvious modiﬁcations.
We consider a Cournot oligopoly with n ﬁrms producing the same product,
where N1 = {1,...,n} is the the set of ﬁrms. For i ∈ N1, let qi be the quantity
produced by ﬁrm i and let Q =
P
i∈N1 qi. The inverse demand function of the
industry is linear and is given by Q = a − p, for p ≤ a and Q = 0, otherwise.
With the old technology, all n ﬁrms produce at the identical marginal cost
c, where 0 < c < a. An outsider innovator has granted a patent on a new
technology which reduces the marginal cost from c to c − ε, where 0 < ε < c.
The innovator decides to license the new technology to some or all ﬁrms of
the industry.8 Consider the following three-stage licensing game. In stage
1, the innovator announces a licensing policy. In stage 2, the ﬁrms in N1
simultaneously decide whether to accept the policy or not. The set of licensees
become commonly known at the end of stage 2. In stage 3, all n ﬁrms compete
in quantities, where the licensees have the new technology while other ﬁrms
8For this section, entering the industry is not a feasible strategy of the innovator. The
entry strategy is considered in Section 5.
8operate under the old technology. The licensees pay the innovator according
to the licensing policy.
For an incumbent innovator, the model is the same as in the last paragraph
except for that we now have n + 1 ﬁrms, where N2 = {0} ∪ N1 is the set of
ﬁrms and ﬁrm 0 is the innovator. The licensing game is also the same except
that in the ﬁnal stage, apart from the licensees, the innovator also produces
with the new technology and competes with all other ﬁrms.
2.1 The FR Policy
A typical FR policy is given by hm,r,fi, where m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n, is the number
of ﬁrms to whom the policy is oﬀered, r ∈ < is the per-unit uniform royalty,
and f ∈ < is the upfront fee that each licensee has to pay. The three-stage
licensing game associated with the FR policy (denoted by GO
FR for an outsider
innovator and GI
FR for an incumbent one), can be described as follows. In the
ﬁrst stage, the innovator announces a triplet hm,r,fi, chooses m ﬁrms from
N1 and oﬀers each one of them a license. The way these m ﬁrms are chosen
(randomly or not) does not aﬀect our results. In the next stage, these m ﬁrms
decide simultaneously but independently whether to accept the oﬀer or not.
The ﬁrms who accept the oﬀer become licensees. The set of licensee ﬁrms
becomes commonly known at the end of the second stage. In the third stage,
all ﬁrms (including the innovator in case she is an incumbent ﬁrm) compete in
quantities. If a licensee ﬁrm produces q, it pays the innovator f + rq.
2.2 The AR Policy
A typical AR policy is given by hm,ri, where m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n, is the number of
ﬁrms to whom the policy is oﬀered and r ∈ < is the per-unit uniform royalty
that each licensee has to pay. The three-stage licensing game associated with
9the AR policy (denoted by GO
AR and GI
AR respectively), can be described as
follows. In ﬁrst stage, the innovator announces a pair hm,ri. In the second
stage, ﬁrms in N1 simultaneously decide whether to bid for the license, and,
how much to bid. If the number of bidders is less than or equal to m, all bidders
win the license with their respective bids. If the number is strictly more than
m, then m highest bidders win the license. Ties are resolved at random. The
set of licensees become commonly known at the end of the second stage. In
the third stage, all ﬁrms compete in quantities. If a ﬁrm wins the license with
bid b, and produces q, it pays the innovator b + rq.
2.3 The Games GO and GI
The licensing game with an outsider innovator, denoted by GO, is described
as follows. In the beginning (say stage 0), the innovator chooses either of the
following licensing policies: a speciﬁc FR policy, or, a speciﬁc AR policy. If the
innovator chooses an FR policy, the game GO
FR is played; otherwise, it is the
game GO
AR that is played. We deﬁne the game GI for an incumbent innovator
similarly, where GI
FR and GI
AR form the corresponding subgames.
Clearly, in equilibrium, if the innovator announces the AR policy hm,ri,
then the royalty rate r will support m licensees, that is, more than m ﬁrms
will bid for the license.9 Similarly, if the FR policy hm,r,fi is oﬀered, then,
in equilibrium, m is supported by r and f. Consequently, for the analysis of
the equilibrium of GO and GI, we can assume without any loss of generality
that when the innovator announces the FR policy hm,r,fi, or, the AR policy
hm,ri, then there will be m licensees.
Consider the game GJ for J ∈ {O,I}. In every subgame-perfect equilibrium
9If the number of bidders is at most m, then every bidder is better oﬀ reducing his bid,
since the innovator is committed to sell m licenses.
10of GJ, in the last stage, all ﬁrms produce the Cournot quantities. Hence, we
can refer to GJ
FR and GJ
AR as games involving only two stages, where at the
end of the second stage, the ﬁrms choose their respective Cournot outputs.
For J ∈ {O,I}, when there are m licensees and the rate of royalty is r, any
licensee ﬁrm in N1 produces with marginal cost c−ε+r and any non-licensee
ﬁrm produces with marginal cost c. Let us denote by ΦJ
L(m,r) and ΦJ
N(m,r)
the Cournot proﬁts of a licensee and a non-licensee respectively. Similarly, we
use the letters q and Π, with suitable subscripts and superscripts, to denote the
Cournot quantity and the total payoﬀ respectively. Now consider the triplet














Next, consider the the AR policy hm,ri where the license has been won by m














Let us consider the payoﬀ of the innovator. Note that for the game GI, the
incumbent innovator produces with marginal cost c−ε. Using similar notations





I (hm,r,fi) = mrqO













I (hm,ri,b) = mrqO









For J ∈ {O,I}, consider a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the
game GJ
FR. Then, by (1), for every m (1 ≤ m ≤ n), and r ∈ <, it follows that
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N(m − 1,r)]. (7)
As for the AR policy, note that in equilibrium, the innovator never chooses
hm,ri such that m = n. The innovator may choose hn,ri only with some
minimum bid, say b. In that case, no ﬁrm will bid above b. This modiﬁed AR
policy will be equivalent to the FR policy hn,r,bi but the latter is simpler to
implement. Hence, we only consider AR policies hm,ri with 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1.
Consider a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the game GJ
AR. Then, for
every m (1 ≤ m ≤ n−1), and r ∈ <, when the AR policy hm,ri is announced,
at least m + 1 ﬁrms will bid, and the highest m + 1 bids will be bJ(m,r) for







In contrast to (5), here we subtract ΦJ
N(m,r) instead of ΦJ
N(m−1,r), because
a potentially deviant licensee knows that irrespective of whether he is a licensee
or not, there will always be m licensees. Consequently, for the AR policy, an






























In view of (6)-(7) and (9)-(10), the innovator has to optimally choose the
licensing policy, the number of licenses to be sold and the rate of royalty. The
following lemma states that when the innovator does not sell the license to all
ﬁrms (i.e., m ≤ n−1), then the AR policy always yields better payoﬀ than the
FR policy. The underlying reason for this result is simple. From (5) and (8),
one can observe that the diﬀerence between the maximum willingness to pay
for each licensee for the FR and AR policies is the diﬀerence between the proﬁts
of a non-licensee when there are m−1 and m licensees respectively. Note that
when the rate of royalty does not exceed the magnitude of the innovation, then
a licensee ﬁrm is at least as eﬃcient as a non-licensee ﬁrm. In that case, the
proﬁt of a non-licensee decreases in the number of licensees. Thus, the only
non-trivial part of the proof is to show that the optimal choice of the rate of
royalty does not exceed ε.












FR(m,r) are deﬁned in (6)-(7) and (9)-(10).
3 Optimal Licensing Schemes
To begin with, we state the results that hold for both outsider and incumbent
innovators.
Proposition 1. Consider the licensing of a non-drastic cost-reducing
innovation. Then, both GO and GI have a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome. In both of these outcomes, the following hold.
[i] In an oligopoly with at least two ﬁrms, the innovator obtains at least (a−c)ε.
13[ii] The private value of the patent is increasing in ε.
[iii] The Cournot price and the payoﬀ of any other ﬁrm fall below their respective
pre-innovation levels.
The term (a − c)ε is the total reduction due to the innovation in the pro-
duction cost of the pre-innovation competitive output. The private value of
the patent is the rent that the innovator can obtain from the licensees. This
is an increasing function in the magnitude of the innovation in case of both
outsider and incumbent innovators (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below).
−[Insert Figures 1.1 and 1.2]−
The respective Cournot prices for outsider and incumbent innovators, pO(ε)
and pI(ε), are given in ﬁgures 2.1 and 2.2. Note that both pO(ε) and pI(ε) are
less than the respective pre-innovation Cournot prices. It can be noted that
pO(ε) is discontinuous at ε = (a − c)/y(n) and ε = (a − c)/q(n), while pI(ε) is
discontinuous at ε = (a − c)/h(n). These discontinuities arise due to a change
in the licensing policy at these points. Observe that for any given policy, both
of these functions are decreasing in ε. The terms y(n), q(n) and h(n) appears
in Propositions 2 and 3, and their expressions appear in the appendix. At these
points, the innovator changes her licensing policy.
−[Insert Figures 2.1 and 2.2]−
Since the Cournot price falls below the pre-innovation level, the consumers are
better oﬀ for any ε > 0. Every ﬁrm, except for the innovator, is worse oﬀ
relative to the pre-innovation case.10 The post-innovation payoﬀ of any ﬁrm
other than the innovator can be seen from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. Note
that there are similar discontinuities as in the case of price.
10This is consistent with Kamien and Tauman (1984) and Katz and Shapiro (1986), where
less general policies (upfront fee or auction without royalty) were considered.
14−[Insert Figures 3.1 and 3.2]−
3.1 An outsider innovator
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the equilibrium of the game GO
that are speciﬁc to an outsider innovator.
Proposition 2. Consider the game GO involving an outsider innovator of a
non-drastic cost-reducing innovation and suppose there is a negligible but posi-
tive cost of contracting for every licensee. Then, the subgame-perfect equilibrium
of GO has the following properties.
[i] In case of a monopoly, the innovator earns the diﬀerence between the respec-
tive monopoly proﬁts with the new and the old technology through an upfront
fee. This payoﬀ is less than (a − c)ε.
[ii] For every n ≥ 2, there is a positive number q(n) ≤ 2 such that when
ε ≥ (a − c)/q(n), the innovator sells the license to only one ﬁrm and sets a
rate of royalty so that the monopoly price equals the pre-innovation competitive
price c. As a consequence, all non-licensee ﬁrms drop out of the market and
the innovator obtains (a − c)ε. When ε < (a − c)/q(n), the innovator sells
the license to at least n − 1 ﬁrms, the Cournot price is above c, and all ﬁrms
continue to operate. The innovator obtains more than (a − c)ε.
In case of a monopoly, an outsider innovator obtains (a−c+ε)2/4−(a−c)2/4,
which is smaller than (a−c)ε. The lack of competition and the resulting higher
bargaining power of the monopolist is the reason why the innovator obtains
less in a monopoly.
Let n ≥ 2 and suppose that the innovation is relatively signiﬁcant, namely,
ε ≥ (a − c)/q(n). Auctioning oﬀ only one license is the unique optimal policy
only in the presence of a (negligible) positive cost of contracting for every
15licensee. In the absence of such contracting cost, the innovator has multiple
optimal policies. In fact, any AR policy hm,r(m)i, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1
and r(m) = ε − (a − c)/m is an optimal policy, the payoﬀ of the innovator is
(a−c)ε in each of these policies and the Cournot price equals the pre-innovation
Cournot price in each of these cases.11
Next consider the other case when n ≥ 2 and the innovation is less sig-
niﬁcant, that is, ε < (a − c)/q(n). In that case, there will be at least n − 1
licensees. The optimal licensing policy depends on the industry size and the
magnitude of the innovation.
3.2 An incumbent innovator
Let us consider the game GI involving an incumbent innovator.
Proposition 3. Consider an incumbent innovator of a non-drastic cost-
reducing innovation. The game GI has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome. It has the following properties.
[i] In case of a duopoly, i.e., when N2 = {0,1}, the innovator pays the other
ﬁrm to stay out of the market.
[ii] When there are at least two ﬁrms other than the innovator (n ≥ 2), there
is a number h(n) > n such that when ε ≥ (a−c)/h(n), the innovator sells the
license to all other ﬁrms using the FR policy. When ε < (a−c)/h(n), then the
innovator sells the license to all other ﬁrms, except one, using the AR policy.
In both cases, all ﬁrms, including the innovator, produce positive quantity.
In case of a duopoly, ﬁrm 1 (the ﬁrm other than the innovator) can always
ensure a payoﬀ of (a − c − ε)2/9, which is the Cournot proﬁt of a non-licensee
ﬁrm who competes with the innovator in a duopoly. Thus, the upper-bound
11This excludes the negligible cost of contracting.
16for the innovator’s payoﬀ is (a−c +ε)2/4−(a−c −ε)2/9. The innovator can
achieve this upper-bound with the FR policy h1,r,fi, where f = −(a−c−ε)2/9
and r is suﬃciently large to ensure that ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it optimal not to produce.
Thus, in case of a duopoly, ﬁrm 0, the innovator, acquires ﬁrm 1 and becomes
a monopolist.12 However, if the innovator is not allowed to charge negative
upfront fee, then the optimal licensing policy for the innovator is the royalty
policy with rate of royalty ε, which coincides with Wang (1998). The innovator
is worse oﬀ, while the other ﬁrm and consumers are better oﬀ compared to the
unrestricted case. Measuring the welfare as the sum of consumers’ surplus, the
innovator’s payoﬀ and the other ﬁrms’ payoﬀ, it is easy to verify that a non-
negative restriction on the upfront fee is welfare-improving. Hence, acquisition
of the other ﬁrm should not be allowed.
For n ≥ 2, when the innovation is suﬃciently signiﬁcant, namely, ε ≥
(a − c)/h(n), then the optimal licensing policy is the FR policy with rate of
royalty rF(n), and all ﬁrms become licensees. It can be shown that rF(2) = ε,
but 0 < rF(n) < ε for n ≥ 3 and rF(n) approaches ε as n increases indeﬁnitely.
Further h(n) increases indeﬁnitely with n. When ε ≤ (a − c)/h(n), then the
optimal policy for the innovator is the AR policy where all ﬁrms, except one,
become licensees.
4 The Incentives to Innovate
For both outsider and incumbent innovators, if the innovation is non-drastic,
the industry that provides the innovator with the highest incentive to innovate
is never the monopoly. For an outsider innovator, this follows directly from
part [i] of Proposition 2. The incremental payoﬀ of an incumbent innovator
due to the innovation is the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ from the optimal
12The payoﬀ of the innovator is strictly increasing in r when r ≤ (a − c + ε)/2 and it is
constant thereafter.
17licensing policy and the pre-innovation Cournot proﬁt. When the innovator is
a monopolist, this is given by
∆(1) =






When there is an additional ﬁrm, then the incremental payoﬀ is
∆(2) =
"
(a − c + ε)2
4
−







It is easy to verify that ∆(2) > ∆(1), and thus the monopoly does not provide
the innovator with the highest incentive to innovate. In general, the highest
incentive to innovate is induced by a market size that is increasing in the
magnitude of the innovation.
Proposition 4. The monopoly does not provide the innovator with the highest
incentive to innovate. It is the duopoly that does so for relatively insigniﬁcant
innovations and the industry size that provides the highest incentive is increas-
ing in the magnitude of the innovation.
5 Signiﬁcant Innovations and Incumbent In-
novators
In this section, we make an attempt to ﬁnd out who is in a better position to
innovate: an outsider innovator or an incumbent one? There is no deﬁnite way
to answer this question since we cannot consider the two types of innovators in
the same model. However, we can shed some light on this issue by assuming
that an outsider innovator could not enter the industry with the old technology
(e.g., due to a patent on the old technology), but equipped with the new
technology, she can enter the industry by incurring a negligible but positive
entry cost. Consider the four-stage game G, where in the ﬁrst stage, the
innovator decides whether to enter the industry, or not. Her decision becomes
18commonly known at the end of the ﬁrst stage. If the innovator decides to
enter the industry, from stage 2 onwards, the game GI is played. Otherwise,
the game GO is played. In other words, when the innovator decides to enter
the industry, we have the case of a Cournot oligopoly in n + 1 ﬁrms with an
incumbent innovator. Otherwise, it is the case of a Cournot oligopoly in n
ﬁrms with an outsider innovator. In either cases, the innovator is allowed to
license the new technology to some or all of the other ﬁrms.
First consider the case when n = 1, that is, when the outsider innovator
faces a monopolist. In that case, the payoﬀ of the outsider innovator is given
by
A ≡






If the innovator decides to enter the industry, her payoﬀ becomes
B ≡
(a − c + ε)2
4
−
(a − c − ε)2
9
.
It can be easily veriﬁed that B > A. Hence, in this case, the innovator is best
oﬀ entering the industry.
Proposition 5. Consider the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game G.
Then,
[i] Suppose n = 1. Then the innovator enters the industry whether or not the
acquisition of the incumbent monopolist is allowed..
[ii] When n ≥ 2, the innovator enters the industry when ε ≥ (a − c)/h(n)
and sells the license to all ﬁrms. Otherwise, the innovator does not enter the
industry.
[iii] If there is no entry fee, then entry is always the best action for the innovator.
Proposition 5 essentially asserts that the innovator will enter the indus-
19try when the innovation is suﬃciently signiﬁcant.13 Otherwise, she decides
to remain as an outsider. This suggests that the extent of rent provided by
signiﬁcant innovations is higher for an incumbent innovator compared to an
outsider. Hence, signiﬁcant innovations are perhaps more likely to be origi-
nated from incumbent ﬁrms. As for less signiﬁcant innovations, the result is
not as sharp. If there is no cost of entry, then payoﬀs from both cases are
equal. However, in the presence of a positive entry cost, such innovations are
more likely to be generated from outsider innovators. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. Consider a Cournot oligopoly in n ﬁrms who are symmet-
ric in that they produce with an identical cost. Suppose there is another ﬁrm,
A, who is outside the industry and has a superior technology as compared to
the incumbent ﬁrms. Now consider the total industry proﬁt in the n + 1-ﬁrm
oligopoly when ﬁrm A enters the industry. Comparing this proﬁt with the to-
tal industry proﬁt in the earlier n-ﬁrm oligopoly, one observes that the former
is higher if and only if the technology of ﬁrm A is suﬃciently superior to the
others. When an incumbent innovator has a suﬃciently signiﬁcant innovation,
then she licenses it to all other ﬁrms, but by setting a high rate of royalty the
innovator still maintains a competitive edge over others. Hence, the total in-
dustry proﬁt is increased, and moreover, the proﬁt of every non-licensee (hence
the alternative proﬁt of every licensee) is decreased. Since every licensee is left
with the proﬁt of a sole non-licensee, and the innovator obtains the diﬀerence
between the total industry proﬁt and the total payoﬀ of all licensees, the inno-
vator is better oﬀ by entering the industry when the innovation is suﬃciently
signiﬁcant.
13When the innovation is drastic, the innovator will enter the industry, since in that case
she earns the monopoly proﬁt with the new technology. Also observe that the conclusion
of Proposition 5 will continue to hold qualitatively in the presence of higher entry costs, as
long as entry is not prohibitively costly.
20Appendix
Notations. Recall that the superscripts O and I refer to ‘outsider’ and ‘in-
cumbent’ respectively and the subscripts L, N and I refer to ‘licensee’, ‘non-
licensee’ and ‘innovator’ respectively. We denote by q and Φ, with suitable
superscripts and subscripts, the Cournot output and the Cournot proﬁt re-
spectively, e.g., qO
L(m,r) denotes the Cournot output of a licensee when there
are m licensees and the rate of royalty is r in case of an outsider innovator.













Throughout the appendix, we shall denote x ≡ (a − c)/ε.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of Proposition 1 in case of an outsider
innovator will be given at the end of the proof of Proposition 2, and the cor-
responding proof for an incumbent innovator will be given after the proof of
Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. We shall use the result of Lemma 1 to prove this
proposition. The proof of this lemma will be given at the end of the appendix.
Since in this proposition, we are only considering an outsider innovator, the
superscript O is suppressed. Part [i] has been shown in the main text, so
consider part [ii] and let n ≥ 2. The results of the following lemmas will
be used to prove the proposition. The proofs are straightforward, and hence
omitted.
Lemma A2.1. Let 0 < ε < min{a − c,c}. For m ∈ {1,...,n}, let
β1(m) =
mε − (a − c)
m
,β2(m) =
a − c + (n − m + 1)ε
n − m + 1
.
Then, for m ∈ {2,...,n}, β1(m − 1) < β1(m) < ε < β2(m − 1) < β2(m).
21Lemma A2.2. Suppose there are m licensees, 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. Then, the
following hold.
[1] If r ≤ β1(m), then
qL(m,r) =
a − c + ε − r
m + 1
, qN(m,r) = 0.
[2] If r ∈ [β1(m),β2(m)], then
qL(m,r) =
a − c + (n − m + 1)(ε − r)
n + 1
, qN(m,r) =
a − c − m(ε − r)
n + 1
.
[3] If r ≥ β2(m), then
qL(m,r) = 0, qN(m,r) =
a − c
n − m + 1
.
For all cases, ΦJ(m,r) = [qJ(m,r)]2 for J ∈ {L,N}.
Lemma A2.3. For m = n, qL(n,r) = (a − c + ε − r)/(n + 1) if r ≤ β2(n),
and qL(n,r) = 0 otherwise. Again, ΦL(m,r) = [qL(m,r)]2.
Lemma A2.4. Let 1 ≤ m ≤ n and r ≥ β2(m). Then, the innovator’s payoﬀ
from any FR or AR policy when there are m licensees and the rate of royalty
is r, is at most zero.
We now proceed to prove the proposition. Recall that the respective payoﬀs
of the innovator from FR and AR polices are given as follows.
ΠFR(m,r) = mrqL(m,r) + m[ΦL(m,r) − ΦN(m − 1,r)]. (11)
ΠAR(m,r) = mrqL(m,r) + m[ΦL(m,r) − ΦN(m,r)]. (12)
We consider two possible cases.
Case I. All ﬁrms are licensees, that is, m = n. Due to Lemma 1, it is enough
to consider the FR policy for this case. Due to Lemma A2.4, we can restrict
r ≤ β2(n). It is easy to verify that when r ≤ β1(n − 1), then the payoﬀ of the
innovator, which is a quadratic function in r, is maximized at r = β1(n − 1).
22On the other hand, when r ≥ β2(n−1) it is maximized at r = β2(n−1). Thus,
it is enough to consider r ∈ [β1(n − 1),β2(n − 1)]. In that case, from Lemma
A2.2 and (11), we have
ΠFR(n,r) = nr













The maximum is attained at r = ¯ r(n) ∈ (β1(n − 1),β2(n − 1)), where
¯ r(n) ≡
(n − 1)[(2n − 1)ε − (a − c)]
2(n2 − n + 1)
. (13)
The maximized payoﬀ of the innovator is given by
ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) =
n[(n − 1)2(a − c)2 + 2(n + 1)(2n2 − n + 1)(a − c)ε + (n + 1)2ε2]
4(n + 1)2(n2 − n + 1)
.
(14)
Conclusion O1. For m = n, the optimal licensing policy for the innovator is
the FR policy hn, ¯ r,f(n, ¯ r(n))i, where ¯ r(n) is given by the (13). The payoﬀ of
the innovator is given by (14).
Case II. Consider the case where there is at least one non-licensee, that is,
1 ≤ m ≤ n−1. In view of Lemma 1, we only consider AR policy for this case.
When r ≤ β1(m), the maximum is attained at r = β1(m), while the payoﬀ is
at most zero for r ≥ β2(m). So, we can restrict r ∈ [β1(m),β2(m)]. In that
case, from Lemma A2.2 and (12), we have
ΠAR(m,r) = mr
"














The unconstrained maximum is attained at r = ˜ r(m), where
˜ r(m) ≡
−(n + 1 − 3m)ε − (a − c)
2m
.
It is easy to verify that ˜ r(m) < ε < β2(m). Since
˜ r(m) − β1(m) =




˜ r(m) ≤ β1(m) ⇔ (a − c) ≤ (n − m + 1)ε. (16)
Noting that 2 ≤ n − m + 1 ≤ n, we consider the following three subcases.
Subcase (a). ε ≥ (a − c)/2. For this case, (a − c) ≤ (n − m + 1)ε for all
m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. Hence, by (16), for every m, the maximum is
attained at β1(m). By replacing r = β1(m) in (15) we ﬁnd that the maximized
payoﬀ of the innovator is (a − c)ε.
Subcase (b). (a − c)/n < ε < (a − c)/2. Then, there is ¯ m, 2 ≤ ¯ m ≤ n such
that (a−c) ≤ (n−m+1)ε for m when 1 ≤ m ≤ n− ¯ m and (a−c) > (n−m+1)ε
for m when n− ¯ m+1 ≤ m ≤ n−1. Thus, for all m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n− ¯ m,
the optimal choice of r is β1(m), and the payoﬀ of the innovator is given by
(a − c)ε. Now consider m such that n − ¯ m + 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. For such an m,
the optimal choice of r is ˜ r(m). The payoﬀ of the innovator for the AR policy
hm, ˜ r(m)i is given by
ΠAR(m, ˜ r(m)) =
(a − c)2 + 2(n + m + 1)(a − c)ε + (n − m + 1)2ε2
4(n + 1)
. (17)
From (17), it is easy to verify that ΠAR(m, ˜ r(m)) is increasing in m when
a − c > (n − m + 1)ε, so that for n − ¯ m + 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, the payoﬀ is
maximized when m = n − 1. Noting that
˜ r(n − 1) =
2(n − 2)ε − (a − c)
2(n − 1)
, (18)
the payoﬀ of the innovator is given by
ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) =
(a − c)2 + 4n(a − c)ε + 4ε2
4(n + 1)
. (19)
Comparing this with (a − c)ε, we get
ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) − (a − c)ε =
(a − c − 2ε)2
4(n + 1)
≥ 0,
which implies that the optimal payoﬀ of the innovator in this case is given by
(19).
24Subcase (c). ε ≤ (a − c)/n. For this case, a − c ≥ (n − m + 1)ε for all
1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. From similar argument as in the previous case, we conclude
that in this case also, the optimal payoﬀ of the innovator is given by (19). We
have the following conclusion.
Conclusion O2. Consider AR policies hm,ri for 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. Then, the
following hold.
[i]If ε ≥ (a − c)/2, then the innovator’s payoﬀ is maximized for any policy
hm,β1(m)i, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, and her payoﬀ is (a − c)ε. However, in the
presence of a negligible but positive cost of contracting for every licensee, the
optimal policy of the innovator is h1,β1(1)i, where the license is sold exclusively
to a ﬁrm.
[ii]If ε ≤ (a − c)/2, then hn − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)i is the optimal policy, and the corre-
sponding payoﬀ of the innovator is given by
ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) =
(a − c)2 + 4n(a − c)ε + 4ε2
4(n + 1)
.
To complete the proof of Proposition 2, we need to compare the results of
Conclusions O1 and O2. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1. ε ≥ (a − c)/2. It can be easily veriﬁed that ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) ≥ (a − c)ε
iﬀ g1(x,n) ≥ 0, where
g1(x,n) = n(n − 1)
2x
2 − 2(n + 1)(n
2 − n + 2)x + n(n + 1)
2,
and x ≡ (a − c)/ε. It is easy to verify that for 2 ≤ n ≤ 6, ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n))
is less than (a − c)ε, while for n ≥ 7, there exists 1 < q(n) < 2, such that
ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) ≤ (a − c)ε when ε ≥ (a − c)/q(n) and the converse holds when






2 for 2 ≤ n ≤ 6
(n + 1)(n2 − n + 2 + 2
√
n2 − n + 1)
n(n − 1)2 for n ≥ 7
(20)
Hence, it follows that when ε ≥ (a − c)/q(n), the innovator sells the license to
only one ﬁrm.
Case 2. ε ≤ (a − c)/2. For this case, ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) ≥ ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) iﬀ
g2(x,n) ≤ 0, where
g2(x,n) = (2n
2 − n + 1)x
2 − 2n(n − 1)(n + 1)x + (n + 1)(3n
2 − 5n + 4). (21)
It can be shown that for all x, g2(x,n) > 0 for 2 ≤ n ≤ 5. For n = 6, there
are constants 2 < x(6) < y(6) such that g2(x,6) < 0 for x ∈ (x(6),y(6)),
and g2(x,n) ≥ 0 otherwise. Finally, for n ≥ 7, there is y(n) > 2 such that
g2(x,n) ≤ 0 for x ∈ [2,y(n)], and it is positive for x > y(n), where
y(n) =
n(n − 1)(n + 1) −
q
(n + 1)(n2 − n + 1)(n3 − 6n2 + 5n − 4)
2n2 − n + 1
.
Conclusion O3. [i] Let 2 ≤ n ≤ 5. When ε ≥ (a−c)/2, the innovator sells the
license to only one ﬁrm using the AR policy and obtains (a − c)ε. Otherwise,
the license is sold to n − 1 ﬁrms using the AR policy and the payoﬀ of the
innovator is given by (19).
[ii]Let n = 6. There are numbers y(6) > x(6) > 2 such that when ε ≥ (a−c)/2,
then the innovator sells the license to only one ﬁrm using the AR policy and
obtains (a−c)ε. When ε ∈ ((a−c)/y(6),(a−c)/x(6)), then the license is sold
to all ﬁrms through the FR policy and the payoﬀ of the innovator is given by
(14). Otherwise, the license is sold to n−1 ﬁrms using the AR policy, and the
payoﬀ is given by (19).
[iii]Let n ≥ 7. There are numbers y(n) > 2 > q(n) such that the innovator sells
only one license using the AR policy and earns (a−c)ε when ε ≥ (a−c)/q(n).
26When ε ≤ (a − c)/y(n), the license is sold to n − 1 ﬁrms using the AR policy
and the payoﬀ is given by (19). When (a − c)/y(n) ≤ ε ≤ (a − c)/q(n), the
license is sold to n ﬁrms through the FR policy and the payoﬀ is given by (14).
Then, Proposition 2 follows from Conclusion O3.
Remark. The function q(n) is decreasing in n, and q(n) → 1 as n increases
indeﬁnitely. For n ≥ 6, y(n) is strictly increasing in n and y(n) → ∞ as n
increases indeﬁnitely.
Proof of Proposition 1 in case of an outsider innovator. Observe from
(14) and (19) that both ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) and ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) are increasing
in ε. Clearly, (a − c)ε is increasing in ε. Since the payoﬀ of the innovator is
continuous in ε, we conclude that the payoﬀ is increasing in ε, which proves
[i] of Proposition 1. Further note that for every ε, both ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) and
ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) are at least (a − c)ε, which proves [ii] of Proposition 1.
To prove [iii], ﬁrst consider the payoﬀ of any ﬁrm. For the FR policy
hn, ¯ r(n),f(n, ¯ r(n))i, the payoﬀ of every ﬁrm is given by
˜ ΠFR =
[(n2 + 1)(a − c) − (n2 − 1)ε]2
4(n + 1)2(n2 − n + 1)2 ,
while for the AR policy hn − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)i, the payoﬀ of every ﬁrm is given by
˜ ΠAR =
(a − c − 2ε)2
4(n + 1)2 .
When the license is sold to only ﬁrm, then we know that every ﬁrm earns zero
payoﬀ. Note that the pre-innovation Cournot proﬁt of any ﬁrm is given by
˜ Π = (a − c)2/(n + 1)2. It can be easily veriﬁed that ˜ Π is more than both ˜ ΠFR
and ˜ ΠAR, implying that every ﬁrm is worse oﬀ due to the innovation.
To complete the proof of [iii] of Proposition 1, we need to show that the con-
sumers are better oﬀ due to the innovation. For the FR policy hn, ¯ r(n),f(n, ¯ r(n))i,
27the total industry output is given by
qFR =
n[(2n2 − n + 1)(a − c) + (n + 1)ε]
2(n + 1)(n2 − n + 1)
,
so that the Cournot price is pFR = a−qFR. For the AR policy hn−1, ˜ r(n−1)i,
the total industry output is given by
qAR =
(2n + 1)(a − c) + 2ε
2(n + 1)
,
and the Cournot price is pAR = a − qAR. When the license is sold to only one
ﬁrm, then we know that the Cournot price is c. The pre-innovation Cournot
price is given by ˜ p = (a + nc)/(n + 1). It can be easily veriﬁed that pFR, pAR
and c are all less than ˜ p, which implies that the post-innovation Cournot price
is always less than the pre-innovation price, so that the consumers are better
oﬀ due to the innovation. This completes the proof of Proposition 1 in case of
an outsider innovator.
Remark. It can be seen that both ˜ ΠFR and ˜ ΠAR are decreasing in ε. However,
for n ≥ 6, ΠFR is more than ΠAR at ε = (a − c)/y(n) (the point where the
optimal policy changes from AR policy to FR policy), implying that there is
a jump at ε = (a − c)/y(n) (see Figure 2.1). Similarly, both pF and pA are
decreasing in ε. However, for n ≥ 6, at ε = (a − c)/y(n), pFR is more than
pAR, that is, the price function has an upward jump at this point (see Figure
3.1).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an incumbent innovator. For notational
simplicity, the superscript I, which stands for ‘incumbent’, is dropped. Note
that the subscript I which appears, stands for ‘innovator’. The following lem-
mas will be used to prove this proposition. The proofs are easy, and hence
omitted.
Lemma A3.1. Let 0 < ε < min{a − c,c}. For m ∈ {1,...,n}, let
θ0(m) =
c − a − (n − m + 1)ε
m
, θ1(m) =




c − a + (m + 1)ε
m
, θ3(m) =
a − c + (n − m + 1)ε
n − m + 2
.
Then, for m ∈ {2,...,n}, θ2(m − 1) < θ2(m), and
θ0(m − 1) < θ0(m) < θ1(m) < θ2(m) < θ3(m − 1) < θ3(m).
Further, for all m ∈ {1,...,n}, θ1(m) < 0 < θ3(m).
Lemma A3.2. Suppose there are m licensees, 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. Then, the
following hold.
[1] If r ≤ θ1(m), then
qI(m,r) = 0, qL(m,r) =
a − c + ε − r
m + 1
, qN(m,r) = 0.
[2] If r ∈ [θ1(m),θ2(m)], then
qI(m,r) =
a − c + ε + mr
m + 2
, qL(m,r) =
a − c + ε − 2r
m + 2
, qN(m,r) = 0.
[3] If r ∈ [θ2(m),θ3(m)], then
qI(m,r) =








a − c − (m + 1)ε + mr
n + 2
.
[4] If r ≥ θ3(m), then
qI(m,r) =
a − c + (n − m + 1)ε
n − m + 2
, qL(m,r) = 0, qN(m,r) =
a − c − ε
n − m + 2
.
In all cases, ΦJhm,ri = [qJhm,ri]2 for J ∈ {I,L,N},
Lemma A3.3. Suppose there are n licensees. Then the following hold.
[1] If r ≤ θ1(n), then
qI(n,r) = 0, qL(n,r) =
a − c + ε − r
n + 1
.
29[2] If r ∈ [θ1(n),θ3(n)], then
qI(n,r) =
a − c + ε + nr
n + 2
, qL(n,r) =
a − c + ε − 2r
n + 2
.
[3] If r ≥ θ3(n), then
qI(n,r) =
a − c + ε
2
, qL(n,r) = 0.
Again, ΦJhm,ri = [qJhm,ri]2 for J ∈ {I,L,N},
Lemma A3.4. For 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, if r ≤ θ1(m), then the payoﬀ of the
innovator for any FR or AR policy is at most zero.
Note that the payoﬀs of an incumbent innovator at FR and AR policies are
given as follows.
ΠFR(m,r) = ΦI(m,r) + mrqL(m,r) + m[ΦL(m,r) − ΦN(m − 1,r)]. (22)
ΠAR(m,r) = ΦI(m,r) + mrqL(m,r) + m[ΦL(m,r) − ΦN(m,r)]. (23)
Lemmas A3.1-A3.4, together with (22) and (23) allow us to derive ΠFR(m,r)
and ΠAR(m,r) for all m and r. Before proceeding further, consider the FR
policy hm,r,fi = hn,ε,0i. This is a policy based on royalty only, and, this
is the optimal one among all licensing policies that are based exclusively on
royalty. For the proof, and other details, we refer to Kamien and Tauman
(2002). The payoﬀ of the innovator from this policy, ΠFR(n,ε), is given by
ΠFR(n,ε) =
(a − c)2 + (n2 + 4n + 2)(a − c)ε + ε2
(n + 2)2 . (24)
This policy will be used since it dominates some other relevant policies,14 as
we show in the following lemmas. The proofs are easy, and hence omitted.
14In particular, ΠFR(n,ε) is more than [a−c+(n+1)ε]2/(n+2)2, which is the payoﬀ of
the incumbent innovator when she does not sell license. This implies that the innovator will
sell the new technology.
30Lemma A3.5. Suppose either r ≤ max{θ1(n),θ2(n − 1)}, or r ≥ θ3(n − 1).
Then, ΠFR(n,r) ≤ ΠFR(n,ε).
Lemma A3.6. For 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, suppose either r ≤ θ2(m), or r ≥ θ3(m).
Then, ΠAR(m,r) ≤ ΠFR(n,ε).
We proceed now to prove Proposition 3. We consider the following two
cases.
Case I. m = n. For this case, we consider r ∈ [max{θ1(n),θ2(n−1)},θ3(n−1)],
and show that the maximum payoﬀ in this interval is at least ΠFR(n,ε). Then,
by Lemma A3.5, it follows that this maximum is also the global maximum.
For this interval, from Lemma A3.3 and (22), we have
ΠFR(n,r) =

















It can be veriﬁed that the maximum of ΠFR(n,r) is attained at r = rF(n),
where rF(n) ∈ (max{θ1(n),θ2(n − 1)},θ3(n − 1)), and it is given by
rF(n) =
n(2n − 1)ε − (n − 2)(a − c)
2(n2 − n + 1)
. (25)
The maximized payoﬀ of the innovator is given by
ΠFR(n,rF(n)) =
(n3 + 4)(a − c + ε)2 + 4n2(n + 1)2(a − c)ε
4(n + 2)2(n2 − n + 1)
. (26)
Further, ε ∈ [max{θ1(n),θ2(n − 1)},θ3(n − 1)], so that ΠFR(n,rF(n)) at least
as much as ΠFR(n,ε). Then from Lemma A3.5, the following is concluded.
Conclusion I1. Let m = n. Then, the payoﬀ of the innovator is maximized
at the FR policy hn,rF(n),f(n,rF(n))i and the payoﬀ is given by (26).
Case II. 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1. For this case, in view of Lemma 1, it is enough
to consider AR policy. Further, due to Lemma A3.6, we can restrict
31r ∈ [θ2(m),θ3(m)]. For this case, from Lemma A3.2 and (23), we have
ΠAR(m,r) =
"



















The unrestricted maximum is attained at rA(m), where
rA(m) ≡
−[n(a − c) + (n2 + n − 4m − 3mn)ε]
2m(n + 1)
. (27)
Observe that rA(m) < θ3(m). Since
rA(m) − θ2(m) =




rA(m) ≥ θ2(m) ⇔ a − c ≥ (n − m + 1)ε. (28)
Then, from (27) and (28) we conclude that when r ∈ [θ2(m),θ3(m)], ΠAR(m,r)
is maximized at r = rA(m) if (a−c) ≥ (n−m+1)ε. If (a−c) ≤ (n−m+1)ε, it
is maximized at r = θ2(m). We already know that ΠAR(m,θ2(m)) = (a − c)ε.
We have
ΠAR(m,rA(m)) =
(a − c)2 + 2(n + m + 1)(a − c)ε + (n − m + 1)2ε2
4(n + 1)
. (29)
Since 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1, we have 2 ≤ n−m+1 ≤ n. Considering the three similar
subcases as in the case of an outsider innovator [see the subcases (a)-(c), pp.
24-25 of the proof of Proposition 2], it can be shown that when ε ≥ (a−c)/2, for
any 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1, ΠAR(m,r) is maximized at r = θ2(m) and, the maximized
value is given by (a − c)ε, which is less than ΠFR(n,ε). When ε < (a − c)/2,
then out of all AR policies, the maximum payoﬀ of the innovator is attained
at the policy hn−1,rA(n−1)i, and it is given by the following, which we ﬁnd
by replacing m by (n − 1) at (29).
ΠAR(n − 1,rA(n − 1)) =




ΠAR(n − 1,rA(n − 1)) − (a − c)ε =
(a − c − 2ε)2
4(n + 1)
≥ 0.
Summarizing our observations from Case (II), we have the following.
Conclusion I2. Let m ∈ {1,...,n−1}. If r ∈ [θ2(m),θ3(m)] and ε < (a−c)/2,
then the innovator’s payoﬀ is maximized at the AR policy hn − 1,rA(n − 1)i,
and it is given by (30). Otherwise, any FR or AR policy gives the innovator
less payoﬀ than the FR policy hn,ε,0i.
From Conclusions I1 and I2, it follows that when ε ≥ (a − c)/2, then the
FR policy hn,rF(n),f(n,rF(n))i is the optimal one. To complete the proof of
Proposition 3, we need to consider the case where ε < (a − c)/2 and compare
ΠFR(n,rF(n)) and ΠAR(n−1,rA(n−1)). It can be shown that ΠFR(n,rF(n)) ≥















Note that we are considering x > 2. It can be shown that g(x,n) has only one
root above 2: h(n), given by
h(n) =
n4 + 5n3 + 2n2 − 4n + 4 + (n + 2)
q
(n + 1)(n2 − n + 1)(n3 + 4)
2n3 + n2 − 4n
.
(31)
Further, g(x,n) < 0 for 2 < x < h(n) and g(x,n) > 0 for x > h(n). Thus, the
optimal policy is the FR policy when ε ≥ (a−c)/h(n), and it is the AR policy
otherwise. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Remark. It can be shown that h(n) > n. Further, h(4) < h(2) < h(5),
h(n + 1) > h(n) for n ≥ 3 and limn→∞ h(n) = ∞.
Proof of Proposition 1 in case of an incumbent innovator. We have al-
ready shown while proving Proposition 3 that both ΠFR(n,rF(n)) and ΠAR(n−
331,rA(n−1)) are at least (a−c)ε. From (26) and (30), it can be easily veriﬁed
that both ΠFR(n,rF(n)) and ΠAR(n − 1,rA(n − 1)) are increasing in ε. Since
the payoﬀ of the innovator is continuous in ε, we conclude that the payoﬀ is
increasing in ε. This proves parts [i] and [ii] of Proposition 1 in case of an
incumbent innovator.
To prove [iii] of Proposition 1, ﬁrst consider the payoﬀ of any ﬁrm other
than the innovator. For the FR policy, this is given by
˜ ΠFR =
n2(n + 1)2(a − c − ε)2
4(n + 2)2(n2 − n + 1)2,
while for the AR policy, the payoﬀ of any ﬁrm other than the innovator is given
by
˜ ΠAR =
(a − c − 2ε)2
4(n + 1)2 .
Note that the pre-innovation Cournot proﬁt of any ﬁrm is given by
˜ Π = (a−c)2/(n+2)2. It can be easily veriﬁed that the both ˜ ΠFR and ˜ ΠAR are
less than ˜ Π, which proves that every ﬁrm other than the innovator is worse oﬀ
due to the innovation.
Finally, to show that the consumers are better oﬀ, note that for the FR
policy, the total industry output is given by
qFR =
(2n3 + n2 − 2n + 2)(a − c) + (n2 + 2)ε
2(n + 2)(n2 − n + 1)
,
so that the Cournot price is given by pFR = a − qFR. For the AR policy, the
total industry output is given by
qAR =
(2n + 1)(a − c) + 2ε
2(n + 1)
and the price is given by pAR = a − qAR. Noting that the pre-innovation
Cournot price is given by ˜ p = [a + (n + 1)c]/(n + 2), it can be easily veriﬁed
that both pFR and pAR are less than ˜ p, which proves that the consumers are
better oﬀ due to the innovation. This completes the proof of Proposition 1 in
case of an incumbent innovator.
34Remark. It can be further veriﬁed that ΠFR(n,rF(n)) is decreasing in ε.
Also, when ε < (a − c)/h(n), that is, when the AR policy is optimal, then
ΠAR(n−1,rA(n−1)) is decreasing in ε. However, at ε = (a−c)/h(n), (the point
where the optimal policy changes from AR policy to FR policy), ΠFR > ΠAR.
Thus, when ε = (a − c)/h(n), there is an upward jump for the payoﬀ of any
ﬁrm other than the innovator (see Figure 2.2). Regarding the post-innovation
Cournot price, it can be seen that the price is more than c. Further, both pFR
and pAR are decreasing in ε, and there is an upward jump at ε = (a − c)/h(n)
(see Figure 3.2).
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we prove Proposition 4 in case the innovator is
an outsider. Then, we prove this proposition in case of an incumbent innovator.
An outsider innovator. Let us denote by NO(ε) the industry size that gives
the outsider innovator the highest incentive to innovate when the magnitude
of innovation is ε. Denoting the payoﬀ of the outsider innovator in an industry
of n ﬁrms by Π(n), NO(ε) is the industry size where Π(n) is maximum. We
have already shown that Π(1) < Π(2), so that it is enough to consider n ≥ 2.
To begin with, consider ε ≥ (a − c)/2. Denoting x ≡ (a − c)/ε, for this
case, we have x ∈ (1,2]. Recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that when
ε ≥ (a − c)/2, the optimal payoﬀ for the innovator is (a − c)ε for n ≤ 6. Since
the FR policy hn, ¯ r(n),f(n, ¯ r(n))i is not the optimal policy for that case, we
have ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) ≤ (a − c)ε for n ≤ 6. For n ≥ 7, by similar reasoning, it
follows that there is 1 < q(n) < 2 such that ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) ≤ (a − c)ε when
x ∈ [1,q(n)] and ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) > (a − c)ε when x ∈ (q(n),2]. It can be easily
veriﬁed that
q(n + 1) < q(n) for all n ≥ 7 and lim
n→∞q(n) = 1.
Hence for every x ∈ (1,2], there exists N such that x ∈ (q(N +1),q(N)]. This
implies that ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) ≤ (a − c)ε for n ≤ N and ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) > (a − c)ε
35for n ≥ N + 1. Hence NO(ε) ≥ N + 1. It can be easily veriﬁed that
ΠFR(n + 1, ¯ r(n + 1)) ≥ ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) iﬀ γ(x,n) ≤ 0, where
γ(x,n) = n(n
2 + n − 1)(n
3 − 2n
2 − 3n − 4)x
2−
2(n + 2)(n + 1)(n
4 + 4n
2 + 3n + 2)x + (n
2 + n − 1)(n + 2)
2(n + 1)
2. (32)
It can be veriﬁed that γ(x,n) has two real roots, x1(n) < 1 < x2(n) and
γ(x,n) < 0 for x ∈ (1,x2(n)) while γ(x,n) > 0 for x > x2(n). Further,
q(n) < x2(n) and x2(n + 1) < x2(n) for all n ≥ 7; lim
n→∞x2(n) = 1. (33)
Thus, for x ∈ (q(N +1),q(N)], there exists ¯ N > N +1 such that x2(n) ≥ x for
N +1 ≤ n ≤ ¯ N and x2(n) < x for n ≥ ¯ N +2. This implies that the maximum
of ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) for n ≥ N +1 is attained at n = ¯ N +1, so that NO(ε) = ¯ N +1
Since both q(n) and x2(n) are decreasing in n, and both converge to 1 as n
increases indeﬁnitely, we conclude the following lemma.
Lemma A4.1. NO(ε) is increasing in ε when ε ≥ (a − c)/2 and NO(ε) → ∞
as ε → a − c.
In view of Lemma A4.1, to complete the proof of Proposition 4 in case of
an outsider innovator, it remains to be shown that (i) there is an x0 such that
NO(ε) = 2 for ε ≤ (a−c)/x0, and (ii) NO(ε) is increasing when ε ≤ (a−c)/2.
Let ε < (a − c)/2. Recall from Proposition 2 that for n ≤ 5, the payoﬀ
of the outsider innovator for this case is given by ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)). For
n ≥ 6, it is ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n) if x ∈ [x(n),y(n)] and it is ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1))
otherwise. Recall that x(6) > 2, x(n) = 2 for n ≥ 7, y(n) is increasing for
n ≥ 6 and limn→∞ y(n) = ∞. For any given magnitude of innovation, let us
partition the set {2,3,...} = NA ∪ NF, where NA is the set of all integers n
such that with industry size n, the AR policy is the optimal policy for the
incumbent innovator, and NF is the similar set for the FR policy. Hence, when
36x ∈ [y(N),y(N + 1)), then NA = {2,3,...,N − 1} and NF = {N,N + 1,...}.
Next, note that
ΠAR(n, ˜ r(n)) − ΠAR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) =
−(a − c − 2ε)2
4(n + 1)(n + 2)
,
so that ΠAR(n−1, ˜ r(n−1)) is decreasing in n, implying that over the set NA,
it is maximized at n = 2, i.e., at the policy hn − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)i = h1, ˜ r(1)i. Note
that
ΠAR(1, ˜ r(1)) =
(a − c)2 + 8(a − c)ε + 4ε2
12
.
From (32) and the last two statements of (33), it follows that for suﬃciently
large x, ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) is decreasing in n, so that the maximum over NF is









2 + 3n − 4)x + (4n
2 − 7n + 4)(n + 1)
2. (34)
It can be veriﬁed that for suﬃciently large n, τ(x,n) has two real
roots, τ1(n) < 2 < τ2(n), and τ(x,n) > 0 for all x > τ2(n). Further,
limn→∞ τ2(n) = 2. All these facts imply that there is a suﬃciently large x0
such that ΠAR(1, ˜ r(1)) > ΠFR(n, ¯ r(n)) for all suﬃciently large n. Since y(n) is
increasing in n and limn→∞ y(n) = ∞, one can choose x0 ∈ [y(N),y(N+1)) for
a suﬃciently large N such that ΠAR(1, ˜ r(1)) > ΠFR(N, ¯ r(N)) for all x > x0.
This implies that NO(ε) = 2 for all x > x0.
Lemma A4.2. There is x0 > 2 such that NO(ε) = 2 when ε ≤ (a − c)/x0.
In view of Lemmas A4.1 and A4.2, it only remains to be shown that NO(ε)
is increasing in ε for ε ∈ ((a − c)/x0,(a − c)/2]. In this regard, we have the
following lemma, which follows from certain basic properties of the quadratic
functions g2(x,n) and γ(x,n), given by (21) and (32) respectively. The proof is
standard, but long and tedious as it proceeds through a series of observations.
This proof is omitted here. It is available from the authors by request.
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           
2 when ε ≤ (a − c)/x0
9 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/x0,(a − c)/x1]
10 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/x1,(a − c)/x2]
11 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/x2,(a − c)/x3]
12 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/x3,(a − c)/2]
(35)
Further, limε→(a−c)/2− NO(ε) < limε→(a−c)/2+ NO(ε).
Then, Proposition 4 for the case of an outsider innovator follows from Lem-
mas A4.1-A4.3.
An incumbent innovator. Let NI(ε) denote the industry size that provides
the highest incentive to innovate to an incumbent innovator when the magni-
tude of the innovation is ε. Further, let ∆(n+1) denote the incremental payoﬀ
of the incumbent innovator in an industry of size n + 1, so that for a given
magnitude of innovation, the industry size that provides the incumbent inno-
vator the highest incentive to innovate is the one where ∆(n+1) is maximum.
We have already shown that ∆(2) > ∆(1). So, we can consider n ≥ 1. Recall
that
∆(2) =
(a − c + ε)2
4
−






Now consider an industry of size n+1 with n ≥ 2. Let us denote by ∆FR(n+1)
the incremental payoﬀ of the innovator due to the innovation when the optimal
policy is the FR policy hn,rF(n),f(rF(n),n)i, that is,
∆
FR(n + 1) = ΠFR(n + 1) − ˜ Π(n + 1),
where ˜ Π(n + 1) is the pre-innovation Cournot proﬁt of a ﬁrm in an industry
of n + 1 ﬁrms, given by ˜ Π(n + 1) = (a − c)2/(n + 2)2. Then, from the proof of
Proposition 3, it follows that
∆
FR(n + 1) =
(n3 + 4)(a − c + ε)2 + 4n2(n + 1)2(a − c)ε
4(n + 2)2(n2 − n + 1)
−
(a − c)2
(n + 2)2. (37)
38Next, consider the case when the AR policy hrA(n − 1),n − 1i is the optimal
one. Using similar notation, again from the proof of Proposition 3, we conclude
that
∆
AR(n + 1) =




(n + 2)2. (38)
Recall from Proposition 3 that the FR policy is the optimal policy for the
incumbent innovator if ε ≥ (a − c)/h(n), and, the AR policy is the optimal
one otherwise, where h(n) is given by (31). Thus, for ﬁxed a > c > 0, and for
a given magnitude of ε, we can partition the set {2,3,...} = NA ∪ NF, where
NA is the set of all integers n such that with industry size n+1, the AR policy
hn − 1,rA(n − 1)i is the optimal policy for the incumbent innovator, and NF
is the similar set for the FR policy hn,rF(n),f(rF(n),n)i. Further, let
¯ NA = {n ∈ NA|∆
AR(n + 1) ≥ ∆
AR(m + 1) for all m ∈ NA}
and deﬁne the set ¯ NF similarly for the FR policy. To determine NI(ε), we need
to compare ∆(2), ∆AR(nA+1) and ∆FR(nF +1) for nA ∈ ¯ NA and nF ∈ ¯ NF. To
begin with, we show that when ε is suﬃciently large, then NI(ε) is increasing
in ε and NI(ε) → ∞ as ε → a−c. Recall that h(3) < h(n) for all n 6= 3, so that
when ε ≥ (a−c)/h(3), then for all n ≥ 2, the FR policy hn,rF(n),f(rF(n),n)i
is the optimal policy. Hence for this case, it is enough to compare ∆FR(n+1)
with ∆(2). Denoting x ≡ (a−c)/ε, it can be veriﬁed that ∆(2) ≥ ∆FR(n+1)
iﬀ ζ(x,n) ≥ 0, where
ζ(x,n) = (n
3 − 5n
2 + 32n − 4)x
2 − (5n
3 + 11n
2 + 16n + 16)(2x − 1). (39)
Noting that x > 1, we can consider x ∈ (1,h(3)]. It can be easily veriﬁed by
replacing n by 3 in (39) that ζ(x,3) is negative for all x ∈ (1,h(3)], so that
∆(2) < ∆FR(4), implying that for this region, NI(ε) = nF +1 for nF ∈ ¯ NF. To












2 + 16n + 16)(2x − 1). (40)
39It is easy to check that φ(x,n) < 0 for all x > 1 when n ≤ 7, implying that




FR(n + 1) = ∆
FR(9). (41)
For n ≥ 8, it can be veriﬁed that φ(x,n) has two real roots, φ1(n), and,
φ2(n), where φ1(n) < 1 < φ2(n). Further, φ2(n + 1) < φ2(n) for all n ≥ 8,
φ2(12) < h(3) < φ2(11), and
lim
n→∞φ1(n) = lim
n→∞φ2(n) = 1. (42)
Also note that φ(x,n) ≤ 0 for x ∈ [1,φ2(n)], and φ(x,n) > 0 for x > φ2(n).
All these facts imply that for every x ∈ [1,h(3)], there is an integer n(x) ≥ 12
such that φ(x,n) ≤ 0 for n ≤ n(x) and φ(x,n) > 0 for n ≥ n(x) + 1, so that
NI(ε) = n(x) + 2. Since φ2(n + 1) is decreasing in n, it is concluded that n(x)
is decreasing in x. Due to (42), we further conclude that n(x) → ∞ as x → 1.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma A4.4. NI(ε) is increasing in ε when ε ∈ [(a − c)/h(3),a − c] and
NI(ε) → ∞ as ε → a − c.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4, it remains to be shown that (i)
there is a constant y0 > 1 such that when ε ≤ (a − c)/y0, then NI(ε) = 2 and
(ii) NI(ε) is increasing in ε for ε < (a − c)/h(3). To prove (i), we note that







It can be veriﬁed that ρ(x,n) has two real roots ρ1(n) < 1 < ρ2(n), and
ρ(x,n) > 0 for all x > ρ2(n). Further, the sequence {ρ2(n)} is bounded, since
limn→∞ ρ2(n) = 5+2
√
5. All these facts imply that there is a positive number
y1 such that for every n ≥ 2, ρ(x,n) > 0 for all x > y1. This implies that
when x > y1, then ∆(2) ≥ ∆AR(n + 1) for all n ≥ 2. Next, recall from (39)
40that ∆(2) ≥ ∆FR(n + 1) iﬀ ζ(x,n) ≥ 0. In view of (41), we can consider
n ≥ 8. It can be veriﬁed that ζ(x,n) has two real roots, ζ1(n) < 1 < ζ2(n) and
limn→∞ ζ2(n) = 5 + 2
√
5. Hence we conclude that there is a positive number
y1 such that when x > y1, then ∆(2) ≥ ∆FR(n + 1) for all n ≥ 2. Thus, there
is a suﬃciently large positive number y0 such that when x > y0, then ∆(2) is
more than both ∆AR(n + 1) and ∆FR(n + 1) for all n ≥ 2, which implies the
following lemma.
Lemma A4.5. There is positive number y0 such that when ε < (a − c)/y0,
then NI(ε) = 2.
In view of Lemmas A4.4 and A4.5, it only remains to be shown that NI(ε)
is increasing in ε when ε[(a − c)/h(3),(a − c)/y0]. It can be veriﬁed that
∆AR(n + 2) ≥ ∆AR(n + 1) iﬀ σ(x,n) ≤ 0, where
σ(x,n) = (n
3 − 7n − 2)x
2 − 4(n + 2)(n + 3)
2(x − 1). (44)
From (39), (40), (43) and (44), it follows that the functions that determine the
sets ¯ NA and ¯ NF are all quadratic in x. The following lemma completes the
proof of Proposition 4. The proof of this lemma long and tedious, but standard
in that it relies on the basic properties of the quadratic functions encountered.
The proof is available from the authors by request.
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2 when ε ≤ (a − c)/y0
7 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/y0,(a − c)/y1]
8 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/y1,(a − c)/y2]
10 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/y2,(a − c)/y3]
11 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/y3,(a − c)/y4]
12 when ε ∈ [(a − c)/y4,(a − c)/h(3)]
(45)
Further, limε→(a−c)/h(3)− NI(ε) < limε→(a−c)/h(3)+ NI(ε).
41Then, Proposition 4 in case of an incumbent innovator follows from Lemmas
A4.4-A4.6.
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove this proposition, we consider the following
two cases.
Case 1. ε ≥ (a − c)/2. Note from Conclusion O3 of the proof of Proposition
2 that when n ≤ 6, then an outsider innovator sells an exclusive license and
earns (a − c)ε. For n ≥ 7, there is q(n) > 2 such that the same is true if
ε ≥ (a − c)/q(n). When (a − c)/2 ≤ ε ≤ (a − c)/q(n), then the optimal policy
for an outsider innovator is the FR policy, and the payoﬀ is given by
Π
O
FR(n, ¯ r(n)) =
n[(n − 1)2(a − c)2 + 2(n + 1)(2n2 − n + 1)(a − c)ε + (n + 1)2ε2]
4(n + 1)2(n2 − n + 1)
.
Since h(n) > 2, from Proposition 3 we conclude that in an oligopoly with n+1
ﬁrms, the payoﬀ of an incumbent innovator is ΠI





(n3 + 4)(a − c + ε)2 + 4n2(n + 1)2(a − c)ε
4(n + 2)2(n2 − n + 1)
. (46)
It can be easily veriﬁed that ΠI
FR(n,rF(n)) is more than both (a − c)ε and
ΠO
FR(n, ¯ r(n)). Hence, an outsider innovator earns more payoﬀ if she enters the
industry instead of being an outsider. Thus, when ε ≥ (a − c)/2, then an
outsider innovator enters the industry and sells the license to all ﬁrms.
Case 2. ε ≤ (a − c)/2. Observe that the payoﬀ of an outsider innovator from
the AR policy hn − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)i in an oligopoly of n ﬁrms is the same as the
payoﬀ of an incumbent innovator from the AR policy hn − 1,rA(n − 1)i in an
oligopoly of n + 1 ﬁrms. Indeed,
Π
O
AR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) = Π
I
AR(n − 1,rA(n − 1)) =




We consider the following two subcases.
42Subcase (a). n ≤ 5. Recall from Conclusion O3 of the proof of Proposition 2
that the payoﬀ of the outsider innovator is given by ΠO
AR(n−1, ˜ r(n−1). From
Proposition 3, it follows that when (a − c)/h(n) < ε ≤ (a − c)/2, the payoﬀ of
an incumbent innovator is ΠI
FR(n,rF(n)), given by (46) and ΠI
FR(n,rF(n)) >
ΠI
AR(n − 1,rA(n − 1)), implying that ΠI
FR(n,rF(n)) > ΠI
AR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)).
Thus, for this case, an outsider innovator will enter the industry when
(a − c)/h(n) < ε ≤ (a − c)/2. For ε ≤ (a − c)/h(n), the payoﬀ of an outsider
innovator is ΠO
AR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1)) while that of an incumbent innovator is
ΠI
AR(n−1,rA(n−1)). Then, from (47), we conclude that an outsider innovator
is indiﬀerent between entering the industry or otherwise. However, taking the
negligible but positive cost of entry into account, she will not enter.
Subcase (b). n ≥ 6. For this case, the payoﬀ of an outsider innovator is
ΠI
FR(n, ¯ r(n) when ε ∈ [(a − c)/x(n),(a − c)/y(n)], and it is ΠI
AR(n−1, ˜ r(n−1)
otherwise. It can be veriﬁed that h(n) > x(n) for all n ≥ 6. Thus, for
ε > (a − c)/h(n), depending on the interval where ε lies, the payoﬀ of an
outsider innovator is either ΠI
FR(n, ¯ r(n), or ΠI
AR(n − 1, ˜ r(n − 1), and we have
already shown that both of these are less than ΠI
FR(n,rF(n)), so that for this
case, an outsider innovator will enter the industry. When ε ≥ (a − c)/h(n),
then from (47), it follows that the innovator is indiﬀerent between entering or
otherwise, and taking the negligible but positive cost of entry into account,
we conclude that she will remain outside. This completes the proof of this
proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove Lemma 1 for the following two cases.
An outsider innovator. For this case, Lemma 1 is proved by showing that
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 and for every r, there exists an r0 such that ΠFR(m,r) ≤
ΠAR(m,r0). Note that
ΠFR(m,r) − ΠAR(m,r) = m[qN(m,r)]
2 − m[qN(m − 1,r)]
2,
43so that ΠFR(m,r) ≤ ΠAR(m,r) iﬀ qN(m,r) ≤ qN(m − 1,r). When r ≤ β1(m),
from Lemma A2.2, it follows that qN(m,r) = 0 ≤ qN(m − 1,r), so that
ΠFR(m,r) ≤ ΠAR(m,r) for every r for this case. When r ≥ β2(m), then
from Lemma A2.4, it follows that the payoﬀ at any FR policy is at most
zero. When r ∈ [β2(m − 1),β2(m)], then the maximum of ΠFR(m,r) is at-
tained at r = β2(m − 1). Thus, to prove the lemma, it is enough to consider
r ∈ [β1(m),β2(m − 1)]. In what follows, we show that for this case
max
r ΠFR(m,r) = ΠFR(m,r
∗) ≤ ΠAR(m,r
∗). (48)
For this case, from Lemma A2.1, it can be seen that
qN(m − 1,r) − qN(m,r) =
ε − r
n + 1
≥ 0 ⇔ r ≤ ε.
To prove (48), thus, it is enough to show that r∗ ≤ ε. It can be easily veriﬁed
that ΠFR(m,r) is decreasing at r = ε. Noting that ΠFR(m,r) is quadratic in r
and ε > β1(m), it is concluded that when r ∈ [β1(m),β2(m−1)], the maximum
of ΠFR(m,r) is attained at some r∗ ≤ ε. This completes the proof of Lemma
1 in case of an outsider innovator.
An incumbent innovator. As in the previous case, the lemma is proved for
this case by showing that for every r, there is an r0 such that ΠFR(m,r) ≤
ΠAR(m,r0). For r ≤ θ1(m), from Lemma A3.4, it follows that the payoﬀ of
the innovator from any FR policy is at most zero, so that one can consider
r ≥ θ1(m). Note that ΠFR(m,r) ≤ ΠAR(m,r) iﬀ qN(m,r) ≤ qN(m − 1,r).
For r ∈ [θ1(m),θ2(m)], from Lemma A3.2, it follows that qN(m,r) = 0 ≤
qN(m − 1,r). For r ≥ θ3(m), ΠFR(m,r) is maximized at r = θ3(m), while
for r ∈ [θ3(m − 1),θ3(m)], it is maximized at r = θ3(m − 1). Thus, to prove
Lemma 1, it is enough to consider r ∈ [θ2(m),θ3(m − 1)]. For this case, we
show that
max
r ΠFR(m,r) = ΠFR(m,r
∗) ≤ ΠAR(m,r
∗). (49)
44It can be veriﬁed from Lemma A3.2 that
qN(m − 1,r) − qN(m,r) =
ε − r
n + 2
≥ 0 ⇔ r ≤ ε.
To prove (49), thus, it is enough to show that r∗ ≤ ε. It can be veriﬁed that
ΠFR(m,r) is strictly decreasing at r = ε. Noting that ΠFR(m,r) is quadratic
in r, and ε > θ2(m), we conclude that for r ∈ [θ2(m),θ3(m−1)], the maximum
of ΠFR(m,r) is attained at some r∗ < ε. This completes the proof of Lemma
1 in case of an incumbent innovator.
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